Abstract. Agents often may prepare for and perform actions without being conscious of these processes. However, in other cases, at some point in time the agent can develop some awareness state relating to the action. This can be an awareness state prior to the execution of the action. An awareness state can also develop in retrospect, after the action was performed. In this paper a neurologically inspired agent model is introduced that is able to make such distinctions. Scenarios are covered in which actions are prepared without being conscious at any point in time. Also scenarios are covered in which the agent develops proir awareness or retrospective awareness, or both. When prior awareness is developed it may be the case that this awareness has a decisive effect on actually executing the action, but it may equally well be the case that the awareness state has no effect on whether the action is performed. All these variations have been illustrated by a wide variety of simulation experiments.
Introduction
Agents often may prepare for and perform actions without being conscious of these preparation and execution processes. However, in other cases, at some point in time the agent can develop some awareness state relating to the action. This can be an awareness state prior to the execution of the action, or an awareness state in retrospect, after the action was performed. When a prior awareness state occurs, the agent becomes aware of going to perform the action. Whether or not the agent's decision to actually perform the action depends on this prior awareness state has been debated extensively in the literature; e.g., (Libet, Gleason, Wright, Pearl, 1983; Haynes, 2011; Wegner, 2002; Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs, 2011 ). Having such a prior awareness state still may leave open whether the agent is able to consciously decide to perform or not to perform the action. For example, is still some form of veto-ing of the action possible? In principle, the awareness state may play the role of generating a kind of green light for execution of the action. However, equally well the prior awareness state may just play the role of a warning for the agent to be prepared that the action will happen (anyway). It has been found that for certain types of actions the decision to perform it is already made at least hundreds of milliseconds (and even up to 10 seconds) before any awareness state occurs; e.g. (Libet et al., 1983; Haynes, 2011) . These findings may suggest that prior awareness often will have no effect on the decision. But this may strongly depend on the type of action. For example, it will be difficult to believe that the action of buying a car or a house remain unconscious and may not be amendable to vetoing based on awareness states. An awareness state can also develop in retrospect, after the action was performed ('what have I done?'). Such a retrospective awareness state often relates to acknowledging others from and taking responsibility for having performed the action. It may also play an important role in learning: by evaluating the obtained effect in a conscious manner in order to improve a next performance of the action. In this paper a neurologically inspired agent model is introduced that is able to make such distinctions. Scenarios are covered in which actions are prepared without being conscious at any point in time. Also scenarios are covered in which the agent develops prior awareness or retrospective awareness, or both. When prior awareness is developed it may be the case that this awareness has a decisive effect on actually executing the action, but it may equally well be the case that the awareness state has no effect on whether the action is performed. All these variations have been illustrated by a wide variety of simulation experiments. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, some background from neurological literature is presented. Next, in Section 3 the agent model is introduced. Some of the simulation experiments are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion.
Background
In the cognitive and neurological literature the notions of awareness and ownership of an action have received much attention. For example, in how far does a person attribute an action to him or herself, or to another person. Persons suffering from schizophrenia may easily attribute self-generated actions to (real or imaginary) other persons. One of the issues that have turned out to play an important role both in the execution decisions for an action, and in its attribution, is the prediction of the (expected) effects of the action, based on internal simulation starting from the preparation of the action (e.g., Wolpert, 1997; Haggard, 2008) . If these predicted effects are satisfactory, this may entail a 'go' decision for the execution of the action, thus exerting control over action execution. In contrast, less satisfactory predicted effects may lead to a 'no go' decision. Predicted action effects also play an important role in attribution of the action to an agent after it has been performed. In neurological research it has been found that poor predictive capabilities are a basis for false attributions of actions, for example, for patients suffering from schizophrenia; (e.g., Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010) . In recent literature it has been reported that the predicted sensory effect and the sensed actual effect are integrated with each other as a basis for proper attribution of the action (e.g., Moore and Haggard, 2008; Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010) . Another element, put forward in (Moore and Haggard, 2008) , is the distinction between action awareness based on prediction (prior to execution), and action awareness based on inference after execution of the action (in retrospect):
'Our results suggest that both predictive and inferential processes contribute to the conscious awareness of operant action. The relative contribution of each of these processes seems to be context dependent. When we can predict the consequences of our actions, as in a high action-effect contingency block, the awareness of action reflects these predictions. This would provide us with a predictive sense of our own agency. In addition, our results show clear evidence that inferential processes also influence the conscious awareness of operant action. (…) The interaction between predictive and inferential processes is of particular interest. (…) The time course over which information about action is built up may be an important clue to this interaction. (…) Sensory feedback provides more precise evidence about actions and their effects. This evidence becomes available only after a short sensory delay, but can then be transferred to memory. Thus, reliable and enduring sensory evidence replaces short-lived predictive estimates. We suggest that awareness of action therefore switches from a predictive to an inferential source as the action itself occurs, and as sensory information becomes available.' (Moore and Haggard, 2008, pp. 142-143) Here Moore and Haggard point at the timing aspect of awareness states of actions. In the agent model introduced below this has been addressed by distinguishing prior and retrospective awareness states.
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Description of the Agent Model
Having neurological evidence on awareness (together with debates concerning its illusionary character in the literature) this section presents an agent model that will be used in agent driven applications where the awareness is paramount (or necessary) in terms of decision making and justifications of actions through communication. More specifically, in problem domains concerning performing or learning specific healthy behaviours or lifestyles having an idea about the extent of the awareness about decisions is an interesting and important issue; this model (with further refinements and customization where needed) may provide the fundamentals. Further this model may be useful in medical domains where through simulations students can learn (or teach) and compare the phenomenal effects of certain scenarios. An overview of the postulated cognitive agent model is presented in the Figure 1 below. The followings have been incorporated in the process of its modeling:
(1) action effect-prediction (through as-if body loop): sensory representation of effect b i is affected from preparation of an action a i (2) preparation for action a i is affected by sensory representation of s, prior-awareness, and feeling of effect prediction of action a i (3) a prior ownership state depends on preparation for action a i , predicted effects b i of a i , stimulus s, retrospective ownership and context c (4) a prior-awareness state depends on sensory representation of stimulus s, feeling of predicted effect, prior ownership and retrospective awareness (5) execution of action a i is affected by effects from prior-awareness, prior ownership and preparation for action a i (6) a prior ownership state and prior awareness state exert control over the execution of a prepared action (go/no-go decision, vetoing) (7) suppressing the sensory representation of effect b i by the both prior-ownership and retrospective-awareness after the action a i was initiated (8) suppressing the prior ownership state when the retrospective ownership state is getting developed (9) suppressing the prior-awareness state when the retrospective awareness state is getting developed (10) a retrospective ownership state depends on co-occurrence of predicted action effects and action effects sensed afterwards (11) a retrospective-awareness state depends on action effects sensed by execution of action a i , retrospective ownership, and prior-awareness (12) a retrospective ownership state and retrospective-awareness are internal states that also can lead to acknowledging authorship of the action (individually), for example in social context (13) execution of an action a i affect the stimulus s in the world
The state labels used in the model are summarized in Table 1 . The model adopts parts of the model presented in (Treur, 2012) but extends this by introducing the prior and retrospective awareness states for actions. These awareness states are taken specific for a given action a, effect b, context c, and stimulus s (triggering preparation of a). When the context c is self, an awareness state for c indicates self-attribution awareness, whereas for context c an observed agent B, it indicates awareness of attribution of the action to B.
Fig. 1. Overview of the cognitive agent model
In this model when a detectable stimulus is occurring, the agent may prepare for more than one action internally. The model is having the innate ability to mentally explore multiple action options in response to a given stimulus before selecting an appropriate action to execute it. In these processes awareness may or may not play a role. Different options are labeled with indices: a x and b x (see also Figure 1 ). (a i , b i , c, s) (Geldard, and Sherrick, 1972; Dennett, 1991) after the EA(a i ) was initiated. Further, in line with (8) above, PO(a i , b i , c, s) gets suppressed  by RO(a i , b i , c, s) once RO(a i , b i , c, s) got strengthened by integrating the predicted sensory effect and the sensed actual effect. The state PAwr(a i , b i , c, s) will be suppressed by RAwr(a i , b i , c, s) expressed as in (9) . Finally, acknowledging of ownership, expressed in (12) above, is modeled by the connection from the RO (a i , b i , c, s) and RAwr(a i , b i , c, s) to the EO (a i , b i , c, s) .
Connections between state properties (the arrows in Figure 1 ) have weights  k , as indicated in Table 2 . In this table the column LP refers to the (temporally) Local Properties LP1 to LP13. A weight  k has a value between -1 and 1 and may depend on the specific context c, stimulus s, action a and/or effect state b involved. By varying these connection strengths, different possibilities for the repertoire offered by the model can be realised. Note that usually weights are assumed non-negative, except for the inhibiting connections, such as  3 , ',  20o ,  27o , and ''. 
The dynamics following the connections between the states in Figure 1 have been designed. Table 3 summarizes the LP1 to LP13 in format of LEADSTO (Bosse et al., 2007) .
The time delay defined in LEADSTO is taken as a uniform time step t here. Parameter  is a speed factor, indicating the speed by which an activation level is updated upon received input from other states. During processing, each state property has a strength represented by a real number between 0 and 1; variables V (possibly with subscripts) run over these values.
Table 3. Specification of Local-Properties
LP1 SS(W, V 1 ) & SR(W, V 2 )   SR(W, V 2 +  [ f( 1 V 1 ) -V 2 ] t) LP2 PA(a, V 1 ) & PO(a,b,c,s, V 2 ) & SS(b, V 3 ) & RAwr(a,b,c,s, V 4 ) & SR(b, V 5 )   SR(b, V 5 +  [ f( 2 V 1 ,  3 V 2 ,  4 V 3 , 'V 4 ) -V 5 ] t) LP3 SR(s,V 1 ) & F(b,V 2 ) & PAwr(a,b,c,s, V 2 ) & PA(a, V 3 )   PA(a, V 4 +  [ f( 5 V 1 ,  6 V 2 ,  7 V 3 ) -V 4 ] t) LP4 SR(c,V 1 ) & SR(s,V 2 ) & F(b,V 3 ) & PA(a, V 4 ) & RO(a,b,c,s, V 5 ) & PO(a,b,c,s, V 6 )   PO(a,b,c,s, V 6 +  [ f( 8 V 1 ,  9 V 2 ,  10 V 3 ,  11 V 4 ,  20o V 5 ) -V 6 ] t) LP5 SS(b, V 1 ) & F(b, V 2 )   F(b, V 2 +  [ f( 12 V 1 ) -V 2 ] t) LP6 PO(a,b,c,s, V 1 ) & PA(a, V 2 ) & PAwr(a,b,c,s, V 3 ) & EA(a, V 4 )   EA(a, V 4 +  [ f( 13 V 1 ,  14 V 2 ,  15 V 3 ) -V 4 ] t) LP7 EA(a, V 1 ) & WS(b, V 2 )   WS(b, V 2 +  [ f( 16 V 1 ) -V 2 ] t) LP8 WS(W, V 1 ) & SS(W, V 2 )   SS(W, V 2 +  [ f( 17 V 1 ) -V 2 ] t) LP9 SR(c,V 1 ) & F(b,V 2 ) & PO(a,b,c,s, V 3 ) & EA(a, V 4 ) & RO(a,b,c,s, V 5 )   RO(a,b,c,s, V 5 +  [ f( 18 V 1 ,  19 V 2 ,  20 V 3 ,  21 V 4 ) -V 5 ] t) LP10 RO(a,b,c,s, V 1 ) & RAwr(a,b,c,s, V 2 ) & EO(a,b,c,s, V 3 )   EO(a,b,c,s, V 3 +  [ f( 22 V 1 ,  23 V 2 ) -V 3 ] t) LP11 SR(s, V 1 ) & F(b, V 2 ) & PO(a,b,c,s, V 3 ) & RAwr(a,b,c,s, V 4 ) & PAwr(a,b,c,s, V 5 )   PAwr(a,b,c,s, V 5 +  [ f( 24 V 1 ,  25 V 2 ,  26 V 3 ,  27o V 4 ) -V 5 ] t) LP12 PAwr(a,b,c,s, V 1 ) & F(b, V 2 ) & RO(a,b,c,s, V 3 ) & RAwr(a,b,c,s, V 4 )   RAwr(a,b,c,s, V 4 +  [ f( 27 V 1 ,  28 V 2 ,  29 V 3 ) -V 4 ] t) LP13 EA(a, V 1 ) & WS(s, V 2 )   WS(s, V2 + [ f( '' V 1 )] t)
Simulation Results
In this section simulation experiments for a number of example scenarios are discussed. First a scenario is addressed where the prepared action has satisfactory predicted effects and therefore is executed. Next, a case is considered where the prepared action lacks positive predicted effects, and is therefore not executed. The third case, explores a poor action prediction capability and its consequences. In the fourth case a scenario is addressed where two prepared actions exist but one is relatively less positive over the other. For more scenarios, see the Appendix at http://www.few.vu.nl/~dte220/IWINAC13Appendix.pdf . In the example simulations, for the states that are affected by only one state (i.e., in LP1, LP5, LP7, LP8), the function f is taken as the identity function f(W) = W, and for the other states f is a combination function based on the logistic threshold function th(σ, τ, W):
Note that the parameter values for the connection strengths used for these scenarios are not unique. Table 4 provides the parameter values used in each case (the changes of weights over cases have been highlighted with a shading color). Threshold (τ) and steepness (σ) values used for cases have been listed in Table 5 , and particular deviations from that in any case will be stated under that scenario in the respective subsections of Section 4. 
Scenario 1: Normal execution with ownership and awareness
The first scenario considered describes a situation where the context c is the agent itself, and a stimulus s occurs. The action effect b of a, is considered positive for the agent and the awareness of action formation and execution will be scrutinized together with generated prior and retrospective ownership states. The simulation of this scenario is shown in Figure  2 . Parameter values used on this can be found in Table 4 under the case 1, and in Table 5 .
The step size taken is Δt = 0.25. The slow value 0.5 for  was applied for external processes modeled by LP6, LP7, and LP8, and the fast value 0.8 for  for the internal processes modeled by the other LP's. In Figure 2 it is shown that (after sensing the stimulus) the agent triggers preparation of action a. Based on that the sensory representation of predicted effect b of a is generated (through the as-if body loop) and followed by the feeling of b. Next these states contribute to generate a prior self-ownership. After activating the prior self-ownership, prior selfawareness is developing, mainly upon the formation process of effect prediction b of a. After that, as a result of prior self-awareness and ownership states, the agent initiates the actual execution of action a which propagates its effects through the body loop (cf. Haggard, and Eimer, 1999; Banks, and Isham, 2009). In the Figure 2 it clearly shows that the execution of action a (via the body loop) also affects in positive manner via sensoring and the sensory representation of b and the feeling of b. In parallel the sensory representation b of a is suppressed due to the prior self-ownership state which causes a dip in the graph (cf. Blakemore et al., 2000; Fourneret et al., 2002) , and that effect will be propagating to the feeling of b too. Due to the action execution the agent develops a retrospective selfownership state which is followed by a retrospective self-awareness state. At the same time the figure shows that the sensory representation b of a is still getting suppressed due to the retrospective self-awareness (cf. Geldard, and Sherrick, 1972; Dennett, 1991) . Finally, the agent communicates self-ownership about the performed action based on retrospective selfawareness and ownership. Note that when the stimulus is taken away, all activation levels will come down to 0 (q.v. LP13), and will come up again when the stimulus reoccurs. 6  11  16  21  26  31  36  41  46  51  56  61  66  71  76  81  86  91 prep action effect rep feeling prior own self prior awareness execute action retro own self retro self awareness self own com
Scenario 2: Vetoing an action with no positive prediction
The second scenario describes a situation similar to the scenario one, but where the action a triggered by stimulus s has an effect b which is not particularly positive for the agent; here action a hardly has an impact on effect b which would have been positive. The simulation of this scenario is shown in Figure 3 . This scenario was modeled by taking the connection strength for the prediction of effect b for action a, and its feeling: ω 2 and ω 12 as 0.2. In Figure 3 the predicted effect is very low compared to Scenario 1, though it is having a sufficient sensory representation level. This clearly shows that the action a triggered by stimulus s that has an effect b which is not positive for the agent (in other wards it is more like neutral to the agent in terms of feeling) leads to not getting any positive feelings out of it. Nevertheless, prediction capabilities are assumed correct in this case, so no high level of b is correctly predicted for a. As a result of this low prediction, the prior self-ownership state also stays at a low level. Due to this, prior awareness is not developed (stays in a very low level), which would be needed to strengthen the action execution. This shows the evidence of facilitating a moderating role of prior awareness (cf. Geldard, and Sherrick, 1972; Dennett, 1991) . Therefore execution of the action also stays very low (below 0.1) and due to that, there is no retrospective self-ownership state and nor communication of selfownership.
Scenario 3: Effects of Poor Prediction; Schizophrenia Case
The third scenario considered describes a situation where again the context c is the agent itself, and stimulus s occurs. The action effect b for action a, in principle is positive for the agent, like in the first scenario above. However, due to poor prediction capabilities this effect is not (fully) internally predicted. This is what is assumed to happen in patients with Schizophrenia, as discussed, for example, in (Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010) . The simulation of this scenario is shown in Figure 4 . This scenario was modeled by taking the connection strength for the prediction of effect b for action a moderately low: ω 2 = 0.2 (values for the other parameters were again the same as per the scenario 1 and refer Table  4 ). For this case Δt = 0.5 was taken instead of 0.25 which was in Scenario 1. Figure 4 shows that the preparation for action a is followed by the representation of the predicted effect b. The predicted effect is substantially low compared to the first scenario, but higher than in the second scenario. As a result of this predicted effect, prior selfownership state is developed, and achieves the maximum level of 0.6. Further, in this situation agent is experiencing around a 0.5 level of prior awareness. Therefore, in contrast to the previous scenario, this level turns out high enough for the execution of the action. Nevertheless, only a low level of the retrospective self-ownership state is developed (approxi- 
Scenario 4: Executing a selected action
The fourth scenario describes a situation where the observed stimulus s leads to two possible action options a 1 and a 2 . The action effect b 1 (of a 1 ) is considered slightly positive for the agent than b 2 (of a 2 ). Parameter values used can be found in Table 4 under case 4 and in Table 5 , except for retrospective self-ownership (τ=2 and σ=12), retrospective selfawareness (τ=0.9 and σ=10) and communication of self-ownership (τ=0.6 and σ=10). Further ω 2 and ω 12 have two values per each in Table 4 in which the first value is always for a 1 driven execution, and the other for a 2 driven execution. In Figure 5 it is shown that after sensing the observed action preparation for action a 1 and a 2 both starts at the same time with the same gradient in the time interval 6 to 19, and after that its of a 2 getting decreased due to its relatively low sensory representation strength over the a 1 . The same phenomenon can be closely examined in the sensory representations of the predicted effects of a 1 and a 2 , the feelings of predictions of b 1 and b 2 , prior ownership of (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ), and prior awareness of (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ). More importantly the difference of the maximum levels in each group will become high in the above order (0.08, 1.2, and 2.6) while giving the idea of the system is strengthening one option over the other. Therefore; these results contribute to the execution of action a 1 (with the maximum strength level of 0.42) while action a 2 is almost neglected. Also the agent will experience only the retrospective ownership, retrospective awareness and communication attached to the action a 1 as the action a 2 was not performed. 1  6  11  16  21  26  31  36  41  46  51  56  61  66  71  76  81  86  91 prep action a1 prep action a2 effect rep b1 effect rep b2 feeling b1 feeling b2 prior own self a1,b1 prior own self a2,b2 prior awareness a1,b1 prior awareness a2,b2 execute action a1 execute action a2 retro own self a1,b1 retro awar self a1,b1 self own com a1,b1
Discussion
The agent model presented here explores how agents prepare for and perform actions and how awareness states can play their role in these processes. Two types of awareness states are distinguished: prior and in retrospect to the execution of the action. The model is a neurologically inspired agent model that is able to make such distinctions. In a number of scenarios it is illustrated how actions are prepared without being conscious initially, but later on awareness states may occur. When prior awareness is developed this may have a decisive effect on actually executing the action, but it might as well be the case that the awareness state has no effect on whether the action is performed. These variations have been illustrated by a wide variety of simulation experiments, some of which were described here; for more scenarios, see: http://www.few.vu.nl/~dte220/IWINAC13Appendix.pdf. The agent model is meant as a basis for subsequent work on developing ambient agent systems able to monitor, analyse and support persons trying to develop a healthy lifestyle. If such systems have such a model of the underlying human processes, they can use this to have a more deep understanding of the human.
In future research it is planned to extend this work by scrutinizing the rationality of the decision making in relation to adaptivity with respect to given environment characteritics. In that respect the role of the feelings generated from internal simulation process and action execution will be considered as well. Furthermore, it may be useful to investigate in more depth the interplay between conscious and non-conscious compounds in human decision making as a regulatory process.
